This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), the case concerns how to interpret “actual knowledge” under Section 1113(2) of ERISA, which sets a three‑year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims.
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), according to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), petitioners argue that the statute requires only that the plaintiff have actual knowledge, not proof of subjective awareness.
According to Respondent, respondents contend that “actual knowledge” means the plaintiff must truly be aware of the breach.
Background and question before the Court
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), according to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), section 1113(2) of ERISA requires a breach of fiduciary duty claim to be filed within three years after the plaintiff first had actual knowledge of the breach.
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), according to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), petitioners assert that the Ninth Circuit’s reading requiring proof of subjective awareness is incorrect.
According to Respondent, respondents argue that Congress intended “actual knowledge” to mean real awareness by the plaintiff.
What each side argues
Petitioner (Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee)
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), according to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), section 1113(2) of ERISA requires claims be brought within three years of when the plaintiff first had actual knowledge of the breach.
According to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), according to Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee (Petitioner), the Ninth Circuit erred by reading the statute to require proof of subjective awareness.
According to Petitioner, there is no legal obligation for a participant to read the disclosures to acquire actual knowledge.
Respondent (Christopher M. Sulyma)
According to Respondent, “Actual knowledge” means the plaintiff himself must have real awareness of the breach.
According to Mr. Wessler, the Court is not being asked to decide the standard for actual knowledge; petitioners have framed the question assuming that if a participant read the disclosures they would have the necessary knowledge.
What happened at oral argument
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. represented the petitioners.
Matthew W.H. Wessler represented the respondent.
Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, appeared as amicus supporting the respondent.
Justice Ginsburg asked what circumstantial evidence would be.
According to Chief Justice Roberts, chief Justice Roberts noted that the case was submitted.
What the Court decided
Why it matters
The interpretation of “actual knowledge” will determine when participants can bring breach of fiduciary duty claims under ERISA.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- 4dadae3185e9b6274ad9-r1-8d4bbc74ccf012e7.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 26, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.