This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
Background and question before the Court
According to Eric E. Murphy, the government alleges that American Express’s anti‑steering provisions have stifled inter‑brand price competition and raised the prices that all four major credit‑card companies charge merchants.
What each side argues
Petitioner (Ohio and United States)
According to Eric E. Murphy, the government met its initial burden to show anticompetitive harm under the rule of reason.
The government contends it has met its prima facie case based on the effects shown at trial.
Respondent (American Express)
According to Malcolm L. Stewart, the Second Circuit erred by conflating the question of whether cardholder rewards became more generous with whether competition on the cardholder side was enhanced.
According to Mr. Chesler, output and quality of credit‑card transactions have increased, and the government failed to prove the price of the product.
According to Mr. Stewart, the Court should proceed cautiously about announcing categorical rules; the existence of four‑way competition on the merchant side and thousands‑way competition on the cardholder side is sufficient to treat these as distinct markets.
What happened at oral argument
Justice Gorsuch asked whether the Court is there to protect competitors.
Justice Gorsuch asked if antitrust law primarily concerns deadweight loss.
Justice Kennedy asked whether output includes premiums or rewards to customers.
According to Justice Breyer, justice Breyer made an analogy comparing the case to “nuts and bolts.”
Justice Gorsuch asked whether American Express’s agreements affect Mastercard’s or Visa’s ability to set their own fees.
Justice Gorsuch asked whether, absent a horizontal agreement, the case proceeds.
Justice Sotomayor asked whether competition is defined by having someone working against you.
Justice Sotomayor asked why the anti‑steering rules do not remove competition.
According to Justice Breyer, justice Breyer questioned what the “vertical case” is, referencing Leegin.
According to Justice Gorsuch, justice Gorsuch paused to note that showing an anticompetitive effect requires more than just an agreement.
- [1] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 5
- [2] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 6
- [3] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 13
- [4] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 25
- [5] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 28
- [6] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 29
- [7] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 35
- [8] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 36
- [9] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 57
- [10] bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdf, p. 69
What the Court decided
Why it matters
Although the Court has recently lessened scrutiny of vertical restraints, this particular restraint may have effects comparable to a horizontal cartel.
The district court found that higher prices were caused by the anti‑steering restraints, not by cardholder rewards.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- bc375ecbd46a26721137-r1-ed895508f34fd62a.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 26, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.