This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
Erick Daniel Davila, a death‑row inmate, is challenging his conviction and sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, invoking the Supreme Court’s Martinez standard.
The petitioner argues that erroneous jury instructions vitiated his only viable defense and that focusing on the strongest appellate issues is a strategic necessity.
Background and question before the Court
According to Petitioner, Davila was convicted and sentenced to execution, claiming that erroneous jury instructions undermined his only viable defense.
According to Petitioner, the central legal question is whether the Supreme Court’s Martinez decision, which extended ineffective‑assistance analysis to trial counsel, also applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
What each side argues
Petitioner Position
The petitioner contends that the Martinez standard should be applied to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, allowing review of trial errors that were not raised on direct appeal.
The petitioner argues that focusing on the strongest appellate issues is a strategic necessity and that the present claim is viable.
Respondent Position
According to General Keller, the respondent argues that the right to counsel necessarily has limits and should not be extended indefinitely.
What happened at oral argument
Justice Sotomayor asked when counsel objected, noting that the brief seemed to assume an objection had been made.
According to Justice Sotomayor, justice Sotomayor queried whether, absent an objection, plain‑error review of the sufficiency of the evidence was the appropriate approach.
Justice Kennedy asked what test should be applied to extend Martinez, mentioning practicality, consequences, private interests of prisoners, and the public interest in finality.
According to Justice Alito, justice Alito expressed concern that the petitioner’s position might create a large hole in the doctrine of procedural default.
Justice Breyer asked whether any empirical information exists on the burden of such claims, seeking data on how often they are raised.
- [1] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 3
- [2] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 4
- [3] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 9
- [4] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 16
- [5] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 19
- [6] bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdf, p. 20
What the Court decided
Why it matters
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- bc0635705d72596371c8-r1-363b1ea8b1f03be4.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 25, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.