This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) argues that the State of Missouri excluded Trinity Lutheran Church’s preschool from a recycling program because it is operated by a church rather than a secular nonprofit.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) contends that the State’s policy is not facially neutral and excludes churches from the benefit.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) maintains that this exclusion violates the Court’s Free Exercise principles.
Background and question before the Court
Justice Kennedy asked whether religious status can ever be the basis for governmental action absent an Establishment Clause problem.
Justice Ginsburg referenced the Everson decision (1947) about tax money for churches and asked if it applies here.
Justice Sotomayor asked how to separate the building’s secular function from its religious exercise.
Justice Breyer asked whether the Constitution permits a state to give public health protection to everyone except churches.
Justice Gorsuch asked how to draw the line between selective and general benefits.
What each side argues
Petitioner Position
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) argues that the State’s exclusion is discriminatory because the policy is not facially neutral.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) states that the preschool’s religious motivation does not make every activity there religious.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) argues that the surfacing being softer does not enable or prohibit religious activities; it is completely separate.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) notes that the State concedes, as did the lower court, that there is no Federal Establishment Clause issue.
Mr. Cortman argues that the provision at issue resembles a Blaine Amendment with anti‑Catholic origins.
Mr. Cortman contends that the case is straightforward under Free‑Exercise and Establishment‑Clause jurisprudence and presents a clear Free‑Exercise violation.
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) argues that the competitive grant’s neutral criteria address any endorsement concerns.
- [1] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 3
- [2] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 5
- [3] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 7
- [4] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 10
- [5] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 21
- [6] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 26
- [7] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 57
What happened at oral argument
Justice Kennedy asked whether religious status can ever be the basis for governmental action absent an Establishment Clause problem.
Justice Ginsburg referenced the Everson decision and asked if it applies here.
Justice Sotomayor asked how to separate the building’s secular function from its religious exercise.
Justice Sotomayor asked, “Do you think that that is the proper way to analyze the question?”
Justice Alito asked the same question about the proper way to analyze the issue.
Justice Breyer asked whether the Constitution permits a state to give public health protection to everyone except churches.
Justice Gorsuch asked how to draw the line between selective and general benefits.
Justice Kagan asked whether the state’s interest in not appearing to give money to one church affects the analysis.
- [1] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 4
- [2] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 4
- [3] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 5
- [4] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 21
- [5] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 21
- [6] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 37
- [7] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 53
- [8] ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdf, p. 39
What the Court decided
Why it matters
According to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), according to David A. Cortman (Petitioner), david A. Cortman (Petitioner) argues that the case asks whether a state can exclude a religiously affiliated preschool from a public benefit, implicating the Free‑Exercise Clause.
According to Justice Kennedy, justice Kennedy’s question highlights the broader significance of whether religious status can ever justify denial of a generally available public benefit.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- ce287be833b4efb13298-r1-097c5fdbc8edae1e.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 25, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.