This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
Theodore B. Olson argues that the per‑se illegality rule for resale‑price maintenance is outdated and should be replaced with the rule‑of‑reason standard applied to other vertically imposed marketing restrictions.
According to Mr. Coykendall, the respondent argues that any agreement between a manufacturer and retailers that fixes resale prices is per se illegal under existing precedent.
Background and question before the Court
According to Theodore B. Olson, leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. challenges the per‑se illegality rule for resale‑price maintenance.
Justice Ginsburg asked whether it is difficult to distinguish vertical from horizontal agreements and whether the manufacturer‑dealer agreement might create a horizontal accord among dealers.
According to Justice Stevens, justice Stevens questioned whether a conspiracy among dealers to fix prices could be justified by additional services and competition from other brands.
Justice Stevens also asked why we can be certain that dealer agreements to provide extra services at higher prices are always harmful to consumers.
Justice Scalia asked whether any arrangement that produces a higher price is automatically bad under antitrust policy.
What each side argues
Petitioner (Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.) Position
According to Theodore B. Olson, the per‑se illegality rule for resale‑price maintenance is outdated, misguided, and anticompetitive; it should be replaced with the rule‑of‑reason standard applied to other vertical marketing restrictions.
Respondent (PSKS, Inc.) Position
According to Mr. Coykendall, the horizontal conspiracy between Leegin and other retailers that fixes resale prices is per se illegal under the Court’s precedents.
According to Mr. HUNGAR, horizontal retailer cartels create incentives that are harmful to competition, similar to manufacturing cartels.
What happened at oral argument
Justice Ginsburg asked whether it is difficult to distinguish vertical from horizontal agreements and whether the manufacturer‑dealer agreement might create a horizontal accord among dealers.
According to Justice Stevens, justice Stevens questioned whether a dealer conspiracy to fix prices could be justified by additional services and competition from other brands.
Justice Stevens also asked why we can be certain that dealer agreements to provide extra services at higher prices are always harmful to consumers.
Justice Scalia asked whether any arrangement that raises prices is automatically bad under antitrust policy.
What the Court decided
Why it matters
Justice Breyer noted that after the drug industry eliminated resale‑price maintenance, margins fell 40 percent for drugs and 20 percent for drug stores, and that eliminating RPM for blue jeans saved American consumers about $200 million.
According to Ping amicus brief, an amicus brief (Ping) argued that following the Colgate regime is extremely expensive and inefficient, and that manufacturers find it more efficient to use agreements like Leegin’s rather than terminating dealers for discounting.
According to Ms. Underwood, ms. Underwood’s amicus brief emphasized that the per‑se rule against resale‑price maintenance has been settled law for a century, distinguishing it from other antitrust rules the Court has overturned.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- 87fd9979acd0bb5c884a-r1-4f464a808a3fa4b8.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 22, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.