This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
According to Petitioner, petitioner cites a Washington Court of Appeals decision (State v. Washington, 143 P.3d 606) that held consecutive sentences trigger and violate Blakely.
Petitioner argues that any additional fact needed to impose consecutive sentences must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, following Apprendi‑Blakely precedent.
The State (respondent) argues that precedent is clear: the statutory maximum for Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes is the maximum a defendant may receive based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict.
The Court notes that none of the authorities cited by the parties quote or acknowledge the passages in Apprendi that define the test as one of effect, not form.
The Court further observes that the holding of Apprendi is central to the issue at hand.
Background and question before the Court
The parties appearing before the Court were: Petitioner Jeffrey L. Fisher, Esq. (Stanford, CA); Respondent William B. Collins, Esq., Deputy Solicitor General (Olympia, WA); and United States amicus curiae Matthew D. Roberts, Esq., Assistant to the Solicitor General (Washington, D.C.).
According to Justice Souter, the central issue is whether a judge’s decision to impose consecutive sentences requires a factual finding beyond the jury’s verdict, as required by the Apprendi‑Blakely rule.
What each side argues
Petitioner Position
According to Petitioner, petitioner asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s statement that the Blakely rule was unclear is wrong; the Supreme Court’s Apprendi decision already defined the statutory maximum as the maximum based solely on the jury verdict.
According to Petitioner, petitioner relies on the Washington Court of Appeals decision (State v. Washington, 143 P.3d 606) that consecutive sentences violate Blakely.
Petitioner argues that any additional fact needed to impose consecutive sentences must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, following Apprendi‑Blakely precedent.
Respondent (State) Position
The State argues that precedent is clear: the statutory maximum for Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes is the maximum a defendant may receive based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict.
According to Respondent, the State characterizes the petition as successive, noting that the petitioner filed a first petition and then a second one.
United States (Amicus Curiae) Position
According to United States (amicus curiae), according to United States (amicus curiae), the United States amicus argues that a distinction could be drawn between Apprendi and Blakely, and that reasonable jurists might accept that distinction.
According to United States (amicus curiae), according to United States (amicus curiae), the amicus notes that Washington’s sentencing guidelines channel but do not eliminate judicial discretion, which could be analogized to traditional sentencing systems not constrained by Apprendi.
According to United States (amicus curiae), according to United States (amicus curiae), the amicus submits that reasonable jurists could accept the distinction and draw a different result from Apprendi.
What happened at oral argument
Justice Souter asked whether the decision to impose consecutive sentences requires the finding of any fact about the crimes, the circumstances, or the defendant’s character.
According to Justice Souter, the only fact needed might be that without a consecutive sentence there would be a “free crime,” questioning whether that fact falls within any of the traditional categories.
Justice Stevens asked whether the petitioner’s argument applied to this case.
According to Justice Ginsburg, Justice Ginsburg raised a procedural impediment concerning a prior petition and the need for appellate permission.
Justice Breyer asked whether any precedent reads the rule in the way the parties suggest.
According to Justice Souter, Justice Souter questioned whether the State’s position required a factual distinction not spoken of in Apprendi.
Justice Souter followed with a question asking whether drawing such a distinction was required.
Justice Souter asked whether the State’s claim was true in fact.
- [1] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 4
- [2] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 5
- [3] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 8
- [4] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 12
- [5] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 30
- [6] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 41
- [7] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 42
- [8] 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdf, p. 47
What the Court decided
Why it matters
According to Justice Souter, the case addresses how the Supreme Court’s Apprendi rule applies to consecutive sentencing, which could affect the constitutional requirements for fact‑finding in many criminal cases.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- 79a04d5c79785f3c542a-r1-f2841bde5fe76e13.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 22, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.