This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
Oral argument in this case began at 11:05 a.m. before the Supreme Court of the United States.
According to Petitioner (Paul M. Rashkind), according to Petitioner (Paul M. Rashkind), the petitioner, represented by Paul M. Rashkind, argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s categorical prohibition of Rule 60(b) in habeas corpus cases absent fraud is contrary to the approach of most other circuits and to the United States’ amicus brief filed in this case.
According to Mr. Rashkind, rule 60(b) provides a disciplined, limited approach with six specific grounds and is not a “wide‑open door.”
According to Mr. Rashkind, under AEDPA, a person who has exhausted state‑court claims, has not procedurally defaulted, and has filed a timely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to have the claim entertained.
Since the passage of AEDPA, only twenty‑eight successful motions of the type at issue have been quantified and published.
According to Petitioner, the first state habeas petition was dismissed because it was not notarized, which was the sole basis for dismissal.
According to Ms. Millett, amicus Ms. Millett argues that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking to set aside a final judgment denying federal habeas relief on the ground that it was incorrectly decided is a second or successive petition under AEDPA and therefore must proceed under AEDPA’s terms.
According to Ms. Millett, ms. Millett further states that the vast majority of matters covered by Rule 60(b) do not involve fraud or a biased judge.
According to Ms. Millett, ms. Millett says her position is only marginally less strict than the State of Florida’s.
- [1] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 1
- [2] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 3
- [3] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 19
- [4] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 20
- [5] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 5
- [6] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 53
- [7] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 44
- [8] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 46
- [9] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 43
Background and question before the Court
According to Justice O'Connor, jUSTICE O'CONNOR: “But why isn’t that always the case if it’s time‑barred?”
According to Justice O'Connor, jUSTICE O'CONNOR: “Well, now, the Federal Government has a different proposed rule than yours. Are you going to comment on their proposal?”
JUSTICE BREYER: “But the Government, by the way, seems a broader rule than yours. The only thing it rules out is new legal claims or new evidence. I don’t see anything in your … tell me if I’m wrong, but I don’t see anywhere where you say we should be able to bring a 60(b) motion based on new legal claims or new evidence.”
According to Justice Breyer, jUSTICE BREYER: “So is that also true if his own witness has committed the fraud?”
According to Justice Ginsburg, jUSTICE GINSBURG: “Do we have that anyplace at – in the papers before us, the first – the first dismissal in the Florida – in the Florida trial court?”
According to Justice Stevens, jUSTICE STEVENS: “But is it correct that they address the same subject matter? Isn’t 60(b) directed at the integrity of the habeas proceeding, whereas AEDPA is directed at the integrity of the original conviction?”
According to Justice Ginsburg, jUSTICE GINSBURG: “Didn’t Congress rule – rule out 60(b) in – in death cases?”
- [1] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 19
- [2] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 20
- [3] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 22
- [4] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 33
- [5] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 36
- [6] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 38
- [7] 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdf, p. 40
What each side argues
Petitioner
According to Petitioner (Paul M. Rashkind), according to Petitioner (Paul M. Rashkind), the Eleventh Circuit’s categorical prohibition of Rule 60(b) in habeas cases absent fraud is contrary to the approach of most other circuits and to the United States’ amicus brief.
According to Mr. Rashkind, rule 60(b) provides a disciplined, limited approach with six specific grounds and is not a “wide‑open door.”
According to Mr. Rashkind, under AEDPA, a person who has exhausted state‑court claims, has not procedurally defaulted, and has filed a timely petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is entitled to have the claim entertained.
According to Petitioner, the first state habeas petition was dismissed because it was not notarized, which was the sole basis for dismissal.
What happened at oral argument
Oral argument began at 11:05 a.m. before the Supreme Court of the United States.
What the Court decided
Why it matters
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- 8971779718bd9fbc71e6-r1-54d12418d20dc1b6.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 21, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.