This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
According to Petitioner, the United States argues that the officers' entry after waiting 15–20 seconds was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Government contends that statute 3109 should be read as a codification of the common‑law knock‑and‑announce tradition, not literally.
Lashawn Lowell Banks (respondent) argues that the appropriate waiting period at a door is 15 seconds.
According to David B. Salmons, mr. Salmons (representing the Government) urges reversal of the lower‑court judgment.
According to David B. Salmons, mr. Salmons notes that the Fourth Amendment standard is flexible and does not always require knock‑and‑announce, considering officer safety and evidence preservation.
Background and question before the Court
Justice asked whether the court had identified only four factors.
Justice Souter asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude that he had been constructively denied admittance.
According to Justice (unspecified), an unspecified Justice asked why the Ninth Circuit's subsequent case with a footnote should not be considered.
According to Justice (unspecified), an unspecified Justice asked how the lower court treated the issue.
What each side argues
United States (Petitioner)
According to Petitioner, the officers' entry after waiting 15–20 seconds was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
According to Government, statute 3109 should be read as a codification of the common‑law knock‑and‑announce tradition, not literally.
Lashawn Lowell Banks (Respondent)
According to Respondent, the appropriate waiting period at a door is 15 seconds.
What happened at oral argument
According to Petitioner, the United States argued that the officers’ entry after a 15–20‑second wait was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Government maintained that statute 3109 codifies the common‑law knock‑and‑announce tradition rather than being read literally.
The respondent contended that the door‑waiting rule should be limited to 15 seconds.
According to David B. Salmons, mr. Salmons urged that the lower‑court judgment be reversed.
According to David B. Salmons, mr. Salmons explained that the Fourth Amendment standard is flexible and does not always require knock‑and‑announce, taking officer safety and evidence preservation into account.
What the Court decided
Why it matters
Mr. Roske stated that opinions have a deterrent effect, suggesting that this case may influence future law‑enforcement conduct.
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- 805a1cae1053fb66a4cd-r1-0d215f8bbadab977.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 20, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.