This educational guide is based on the linked primary sources. It is not a Court publication, is not affiliated with the Court, and is not legal advice.
In brief
Overview
According to Petitioners, the case concerns whether Congress in 1994 limited states' authority to delegate police powers over local safety matters to political subdivisions.
According to Mr. Stewart, respondents argue that Congress may constitutionally preempt municipal law without preempting state law.
Petitioners warn that interpreting the statute this way would eliminate many local size‑and‑weight regulations that every state currently delegates to its cities.
Background and question before the Court
According to Petitioners, the question presented is whether Congress in 1994 divested the States of their traditional authority to delegate police powers over local safety matters to their political subdivisions.
What each side argues
Petitioner Position
Petitioners argue that Congress did not divest states of the authority to delegate police powers to political subdivisions.
Respondent Position
According to Mr. Stewart, respondents cite the Lee Deadwood case as support for the proposition that Congress may constitutionally preempt municipal law without preempting state law.
According to Mr. Cordray, respondents contend that federal law preempts municipalities and other local governments from imposing their own licensing schemes on motor carriers of property.
According to Mr. Cordray, respondents argue there is no substantive Tenth Amendment issue or commandeering of states or local governments.
According to Mr. Cordray, respondents say the statute should be read to allow states to enforce contracts through their courts but not to legislate in the area.
What happened at oral argument
Chief Justice Rehnquist asked whether the statutory language implies that only a State, not a political subdivision, is covered.
Chief Justice Rehnquist asked whether the safety‑regulatory authority provision includes political subdivisions of a State.
A Justice asked what the closest case respondents could cite to show a contrary practice.
According to Justice, a Justice questioned whether the statute is the best possible statute.
According to Justice, a Justice noted a difference in the “enact or enforce” language between subsections of the statute.
A Justice asked whether the Court should give force to the petitioner's argument that states should be presumed to have authority to govern themselves.
- [1] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 4
- [2] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 6
- [3] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 20
- [4] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 36
- [5] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 41
- [6] fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdf, p. 53
What the Court decided
Why it matters
If the statute is interpreted uniformly, every state’s delegations to cities for size‑and‑weight controls would be eliminated.
According to Mr. Cordray, federal preemption of municipal licensing schemes affects motor carriers of property nationwide.
According to Mr. Cordray, the dispute does not raise a substantive Tenth Amendment issue, aligning with prior precedent (Wolens).
Terms to know
No glossary terms are available for this guide.
Primary sources
Read the source materials on the official site or open the immutable repository copy used for this guide.
- fde954fa33852152c0cc-r1-60ce850b398a2b65.pdforal argument transcript
Guide generated September 19, 2026. Automated validation accepted this version.